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Collective Self-Blockade? Why the UN 
Climate Conference in Paris Could Fail 
Joachim Betz and Babette Never
On 19 and 20 April 2015, the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate took 
place in Washington, DC. Industrialised countries and emerging economies are meeting 
in multiple forums this year to explore their positions in advance of the UN Climate 
Change Conference in Paris in December.
Analysis
The preparations for an effective global climate change agreement at the UN Climate 
Change Conference in Paris in December 2015 are proving to be difficult. While the 
BRICS states, the United States, and the EU are verbally proclaiming their commitment, 
they often impede themselves as a group due to national interests. Against this backdrop, 
it is necessary to consider alternatives to a global but weak climate change agreement.
  Of the key countries and groups, only the EU, the United States, and Russia have 
submitted their intended nationally determined contributions to climate protection 
to the United Nations. The political approach taken by the emerging economies is 
being influenced by international expectations and national constellations.
  Due to their internal preferences, neither the United States nor China are interested 
in a strong, obligatory climate agreement at the global level. This makes a global 
consensus unlikely. Bilateral, public–private, and market-based solutions are easier 
to implement politically than a new global agreement.
  The renewed failure to reach a global climate agreement could lead to other options 
for action. Repeated and complicated negotiations at the global level will certainly 
not bring about the changes necessary to reach the 2°C goal on time.
  Three scenarios for the future are possible: The chaotic and multi-stakeholder 
international politics of climate change will continue. Climate clubs made up of 
key emitters will become trailblazers and will impose sanctions on non-members. 
A citizens’ climate politics in the sense of the “Copenhagen Theory of Change” will 
supplement or replace the great transformation from above.
  The EU and Germany could use meetings such as the G7 or  the Major Economies Fo-
rum to discuss the potential of climate clubs and could set the latter in motion should 
the UN Climate Conference in Paris fail. 
Keywords: climate change negotiations, emerging economies, BRICS, climate club, United 
States, EU
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What Will Be Negotiated in Paris?
The climate carousel goes round another time. 
While global warming proceeds unstoppably, the 
gap between the negotiating positions of the devel-
oping and industrialised countries persists – de-
spite the discursive optimism. The existing plans 
to reduce emissions would have to be increased by 
8 to 10 per cent by 2020 in order to maintain the 
desired 2°C warming limit. Approximately two-
thirds of the global carbon budget required for 
this goal has been used up already (UNEP 2014). 
The path to a global climate change agreement is 
marked by dispute on all of the central points, as 
the content of the Geneva draft text from February 
of this year demonstrated. During the negotiations 
in Paris in December 2015, governments will have 
to decide whether they want to conclude a new, 
legally binding global agreement. Who will be re-
quired to decrease emissions and whether this will 
be tied to financial measures remains to be seen. 
Will there be a “climate of various speeds” with 
different rules and paths for industrialised and 
emerging economies?
The principle of common but differentiated re-
sponsibilities for industrialised and developing 
countries has been in place since 1992. Even some 
emerging economies – for example, Brazil – now 
promote its dissolution, thus giving up their unre-
lenting support of the principle to date. The con-
clusion of a new global climate agreement will al-
so depend on how the controversial question of fi-
nancing climate policies in developing countries is 
dealt with. Yet even when there is a global agree-
ment that is binding for all parties, will it be im-
plemented? The key question is this: How can it 
be guaranteed that all the key emitters really do 
enough? Industrialised and emerging economies 
must introduce rapid and comprehensive solu-
tions to stem climate change and avoid significant 
additional costs at a later point in time.
When it comes to global public goods such as the 
climate, the temptation to free-ride is great. Free-
riding actors, who are supposed to each do their 
share, let others take the required action and bear 
the majority of the costs while deriving the bene-
fits themselves. For countries that face high costs 
to convert their existing energy infrastructure, this 
temptation is particularly great. Once countries 
are locked into high-carbon development paths, 
energy system transformation becomes even more 
costly (Jakob et al. 2014). Getting many countries 
to cooperate without the use of sanctions is there-
fore difficult. Furthermore, immediate climate pro-
tection benefits future generations more strongly 
than current ones. These factors collapse the nec-
essary equilibrium between cooperating countries 
– which is why the Kyoto Protocol was not imple-
mented by all parties (Nordhaus 2015). A similar 
fate could await the Paris result.
The negotiation of a global but weak agreement 
takes up important time. Letting a weak agree-
ment fail can open up windows of opportunity for 
action if, through shock, deeply ingrained patterns 
of action and structural barriers are broken down. 
Innovation theories, organisational research, and 
concepts of learning in the literature on socioen-
vironmental and sociotechnical transformation all 
emphasise the catalytic, creative function of such 
crises. To avoid resignation and a retreat from cli-
mate prevention, effective alternatives should be 
carefully prepared. For the mitigation of green-
house gas emissions, climate clubs made up of 
larger countries represent an alternative.
Background to the Paris 2015 UN Climate 
Change Conference
The 1997 Kyoto Protocol made a strong distinc-
tion between industrialised countries, which were 
obligated to reduce emissions due to their histori-
cal responsibility, and the remaining states, which 
were to be supported on a more climate-friendly 
path through, inter alia, financial assistance and 
technology transfer. However, significant emit-
ters among the industrialised countries have nev-
er joined the protocol (the United States), have 
not ratified it (Australia), have withdrawn (Cana-
da, Russia), or have weakened their commitments 
(Japan). Many industrialised states have not ful-
filled their commitments (UNEP 2014). The second 
phase of the Kyoto Protocol has only been ratified 
by 28 of the 192 parties to the contract. 
Furthermore, Kyoto II is scarcely an effective 
instrument because it does not account for the sig-
nificantly increased emissions of the emerging 
economies. An adherence to historical responsibil-
ities would not reduce climate change by a suitable 
amount. China alone was responsible for approxi-
mately one-quarter of all global emissions in 2012 
– 60 per cent more than the United States. In the 
same year, India contributed 6.2 per cent and Rus-
sia 5.1 per cent. While Brazil and South Africa on-
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ly produce a small share of global emissions, their 
emissions per capita are very high. The poorer de-
veloping countries – particularly the threatened is-
land states – as well as the United States and the 
EU are thus pushing for stronger emissions reduc-
tions in all emerging economies.
In previous negotiating rounds, it was agreed 
that all contract parties would, where possible, 
submit their planned national contributions to 
emissions reduction (intended nationally deter-
mined contributions, INDCs) by the end of March 
2015. The INDCs are designed to serve the prepa-
ration of a new global climate change agreement 
from 2020 onwards but are independent of the le-
gally binding character of the future agreement. 
They should contain quantifiable information on 
how the emissions have been calculated, a time 
frame for implementing the suggested measures, 
the sectors dealt with, and the monitoring process 
(Ray et al. 2015). 
If the INDCs are reflected in the new climate 
change agreement, the character of the agreement 
could shift for everyone from the goal of global 
and binding reduction goals to “bottom-up” obli-
gations in accordance with national abilities and 
interests. This trend has been gaining in influ-
ence since the conference in Copenhagen (2009). 
While this development corresponds to the inter-
ests of the United States, it reduces the probabil-
ity that there will be clear, fair allocation rules in 
accordance with a global carbon budget. The bud-
get approach is supported by many experts be-
cause it calculates already-used and still-possible 
emissions per country based on the starting point 
of “2°C warming” (WBGU 2014).
Whether the INDCs and thus the new agree-
ment will focus on reduction or, instead, on adap-
tation to climate change, on the financing of a cli-
mate-friendly political transformation, and on the 
accompanying technology transfer is unclear. At 
the Lima Climate Change Conference in December 
2014, the developing countries turned against an 
agreement centred primarily on reduction, while 
the industrialised countries supported it. The poor-
est states insisted on compensation for the climate 
damage to date and thus achieved at least a verbal 
success. The Green Climate Fund (GCF) has been 
in place since 2010 and is the source of financing 
for climate-related reduction and adaptation activ-
ities. To date, however, the GCF’s funds have been 
far too limited. The industrialised countries agreed 
to contribute USD 100 billion in funding annually 
by 2020. To date commitments of 10 billion have 
been collected. The critical funding gap could sig-
nificantly reduce many developing countries’ mo-
tivation to deal with climate change policy.
It is certain that there will be no ex ante evalu-
ation of the INDCs with respect to the attainment 
of the 2°C goal in advance of the Paris conference; 
thus, it cannot be guaranteed that the national con-
tributions will add up to the necessary level. This 
course of action was supported by the EU, the 
group of African states, and the island states. Chi-
na and India, however, spoke out against it, fear-
ing interference in their national sovereignty (van 
Asselt et al. 2015).
National Interests and INDCs
Of the following closely considered countries, on-
ly the EU, the United States, Russia, and Mexico 
had submitted their INDCs to the UN by the end 
of the first quarter of 2015. Because each country 
is relatively free to decide on its method of calcu-
lation, content, and choice of mitigation strategies, 
it is unlikely that we shall see ambitious, compara-
ble INDCs; this also applies to Brazil, China, India, 
and South Africa.
In Copenhagen in 2009, Brazil announced an 
ambitious, voluntary commitment to reduce car-
bon emissions from 36.1 per cent to 38.9 per cent 
of projected business-as-usual levels by 2020. This 
would be a reduction of 6 to 8 per cent relative to 
2005 levels (La Rovere et al. 2014). The majority 
of the savings fall upon limitations on logging in 
the Amazon, thus there is no requirement for ex-
tensive new investment. The contribution of new 
sectors (energy production being the exception) 
is not specified. The deforestation rate has indeed 
dropped dramatically, but emissions from energy 
and agriculture have increased. President Rousseff 
is more focused on development and the econom-
ic crisis than climate policy, so ambitious targets 
broken down by sector in Brazil’s INDC are not to 
be expected. 
In Copenhagen China announced a reduction 
in the emissions intensity of its growth compared 
to 2005 levels from 40 to 45 per cent by 2020. At a 
meeting between the Chinese and US governments 
in November 2014, China additionally promised 
that its emissions would peak in 2030 and there-
after decline. Various economists believe that Chi-
na will actually reach that point in 2020 because 
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the coal percentage in its energy production has al-
ready peaked (Green und Stern 2015). This would 
be typical of China’s strategy to behave conserva-
tively at the international level to avoid the risk of 
embarrassing itself. Domestically, however, the 
government is pursuing diverse mitigation pro-
grammes – also with the goal of presenting itself 
to the Chinese public as an active climate protec-
tor. Despite the new promises, China’s emissions 
will likely increase on the whole until 2030, so that 
they will absorb 40 per cent of the remaining glob-
al carbon budget for the 2°C warming. Even if Chi-
na reaches its goal, there will only be a very small 
amount of leeway for other countries.
In 2009 India announced it would reduce the 
emissions intensity per unit of its GDP by 20–25 
per cent (on 2005 levels) by 2020. This savings 
target will most likely be achieved without any 
great effort, as the corresponding mitigation pro-
gramme was already underway. At the moment, 
there are no new mitigation commitments on 
hand. Thus, the Indian government is once again 
confirming its traditional, strict negotiating posi-
tion: for them, development and fighting poverty 
take priority, and both involve higher emissions. It 
is therefore unlikely that a reduction in emissions 
will occur within the next 30 years. The govern-
ment has announced, however, increased efforts to 
promote public transport, solar energy, and refor-
estation. The goals for the generation of renewable 
energy have been raised (for solar energy, from 20 
to 100 gigawatts by 2022), and carbon taxes have 
been doubled to promote these energy sources 
(Ray et al. 2015). Nevertheless, the government 
is also planning to double its coal production by 
2019 as well as to relax environmental regulations 
for numerous public and private investment proj-
ects. This would result in a significant increase in 
emissions. India’s climate policy thus has two fac-
es: on the one hand, within the governmental and 
private sectors there is strong interest in renewable 
energies and energy efficiency, which means that 
more climate protection is possible through mar-
ket mechanisms and public–private partnerships; 
on the other hand, India tends to put the brakes on 
during climate negotiations, which has now led to 
its isolation within the G77.
South Africa is strongly guided by previously 
published action plans. Its voluntary commitment 
at Copenhagen (an emissions reduction of 34 per 
cent by 2020 and 40 per cent by 2040 compared to 
an unabated emissions path) was attached to the 
condition of a fair, ambitious, and effective glob-
al climate agreement. The current national IN-
DC process suggests that South Africa will aim 
for a high reduction goal with flexible intermedi-
ate goals until 2050. National climate protection, 
however, lags behind the country’s goal to peak 
emissions between 2020 and 2025. The South Af-
rican government was keen to provide a positive 
picture of its climate protection efforts to the in-
ternational audience at the 2011 climate negotia-
tions in Durban. In recent years, however, the re-
spective efforts have slipped. While renewable en-
ergies are being further developed and the consis-
tently postponed carbon tax shall be implemented 
in 2016, the country in fact remains far from con-
verting to a green economy. Economic problems 
and high unemployment levels make it improba-
ble that the government will choose to strictly reg-
ulate the coal and mining industries.
Mexico was the first emerging economy to sub-
mit its INDC. The government announced that 
greenhouse gas emissions would peak in 2026 and 
that it would reduce CO
2 emissions by 22 per cent 
and soot emissions by 51 per cent by 2030 com-
pared to business-as-usual levels. These goals are 
no longer attached to financial help for technolo-
gy transfer and adaptation measures, as was still 
the case in Copenhagen. According to its national 
INDC, Mexico’s emissions could actually drop by 
40 per cent if international funds were made avail-
able, technology transfer were to take place, and – 
in Paris or later – a global price for coal were estab-
lished. The coal tax introduced in 2014 was set at a 
modest USD 3.50 per tonne, meaning that it hardly 
had any effect in reducing emissions. In fact, Mex-
ico’s emissions have been increasing considerably 
for years despite the commotion caused by its an-
nouncement. 
The United States released its greenhouse gas 
reduction targets on 31 March 2015. According 
to these, 26–28 per cent of greenhouse gas emis-
sions are expected to be saved by 2025 compared 
to 2005 levels (equivalent to a 14–17 per cent re-
duction on 1990 levels). Individual sectors, howev-
er, will not be assigned any specific target values. 
Furthermore, it is unclear how goal achievement 
will be verified and whether Congress will pass 
the necessary implementation legislation. The US 
government therefore has a strong interest in de-
veloping an alternative climate protection format 
which does not require approval. Indeed, the ex-
pansion of fracking has increased the pressure to 
- 5 -GIGA Focus International Edition/English  4/2015
act in the area of renewable energy development, 
which itself stems from increasing international oil 
prices. Pioneer states like California and President 
Obama’s executive order of 19 March 2015 (requir-
ing a 40 per cent reduction in emissions by 2025 
across/within federal agencies compared to 2005) 
reveal the United States’ preference for national-
level, as opposed to UN-level, approaches to cli-
mate protection. Building on existing cooperation 
formats with China, India, and the EU in the area 
of energy, the integration of climate protection and 
trade cooperation in a climate club could offer the 
United States significant benefits – namely, a finan-
cial gain of up to USD 44 billion (Nordhaus 2015).
Globally, the European Union’s emissions re-
duction target of 40 per cent by 2030 (compared to 
1990 levels) is the most ambitious goal yet. Given 
that emissions were down by almost 15 per cent in 
2012, this reduction target is not completely out of 
the question. The different interests and reduction 
capacities of its member states have so far prevent-
ed the EU from being even more proactive. Giv-
en France’s leadership role at the upcoming UN 
Climate Conference in Paris and Germany’s role 
as a trailblazer in renewable energy and an advo-
cate for more climate protection efforts in the past, 
these two countries currently bear particular re-
sponsibility for the emissions reduction issue. In 
the event that the Paris summit fails, a climate club 
could help both countries to preserve their positive 
roles as pioneers.
On 1 April 2015 Russia announced a reduc-
tion in greenhouse gases of 20–25 per cent by 
2030 on 1990 levels. If the forest sector is includ-
ed, this represents a de facto reduction of just 6–11 
per cent compared to 1990 levels in the industri-
al sector and an increase of 30–38 per cent com-
pared to 2012 levels. The Russian INDC is charac-
terised by a lack of concrete information about sec-
tors, measures, and the monitoring of measures; 
only the adoption of necessary laws is publicised. 
Russia is not actively pursuing any climate protec-
tion strategies, because emissions are currently ap-
proximately 50 per cent below 1990 levels due to 
the collapse of the industrial sector. Under Presi-
dent Putin, the Russian government has contribut-
ed very little to bringing about an international cli-
mate agreement.
The above summary shows that the content 
and implementation speeds of concrete activities 
in individual countries are hugely varied and thus 
render set global targets out of reach. 
The Link between INDCs and Climate 
Performance
The announcements made on the internation-
al stage do little to suggest that the above-men-
tioned states’ efforts in energy and climate policy 
will achieve the 2°C goal. This can be seen by com-
paring the commitments under the Kyoto Protocol 
with actual greenhouse gas emissions. 
Evaluating the success of climate negotiations 
in the area of mitigation is possible on the basis of 
the development of individual economies’ energy 
and emissions intensity or the complex rankings 
of energy and climate performance. In the past, 
a weak global green civil society, limited finan-
cial leeway for active national climate policy, and 
the relative importance of fossil energy were cit-
ed as explanatory factors for the weak climate per-
formance of emerging economies (Never und Betz 
2014). A good indicator of success is the change in 
energy intensity per unit of GDP (in tonnes of oil 
equivalent per USD), which captures energy-sav-
ing activities as well as (indirectly) CO
2 emissions. 
The biggest reductions in the energy intensity of 
production for the period 1990–2013 are accounted 
for by China (-4.1 per cent per year), India (-2 per 
cent), and Indonesia (-1.2 per cent). Mexico (-0.9 
per cent), South Africa (-0.8 per cent), and South 
Korea (-0.4 per cent) all witnessed slight decreases, 
whereas Brazil (+0.3 per cent) experienced a min-
imal increase. With respect to emissions intensity, 
there is virtually no change in this order – only In-
donesia drops down significantly and India mod-
erately, in both cases due to deforestation.
In terms of investment in renewable energy, the 
image of emerging economies as climate-policy in-
flexible is being turned on its head: in 2014, for the 
first time, these countries invested almost as much 
in renewable energy sources as did industrialised 
nations (USD 131.3 billion versus USD 138.9 bil-
lion). These nations’ investments also demonstrat-
ed – as in previous years – significantly higher 
growth (36 percent versus 3 percent). Here, the un-
disputed leader was China (which invested USD 
81 billion in wind energy, followed, at a great dis-
tance, by the United States, Japan, the United King-
dom, Germany, and Canada). The investment vol-
umes of Brazil (USD 7.4 billion), India (USD 7.1 bil-
lion), and South Africa (USD 5.5 billion) were con-
siderably smaller than China’s – due to the diffi-
cult economic situations faced by these economies 
(Frankfurt School-UNEP 2015). 
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Moreover, China, Brazil, India, and South Af-
rica are taking the first steps towards converting 
their economies to green economies. For now, they 
are focusing on feasible mitigation options that of-
fer co-benefits between development and mitiga-
tion. These countries thus not only have ambitious 
expansion plans for renewable energy sources, 
they are also promoting these through attractive 
feed-in tariffs and obligations. Standards for the 
use of household appliances, motor vehicles, and 
the insulation of public buildings have also been 
stipulated, but the concrete implementation there-
of has proven difficult. Carbon taxes have been in-
troduced or raised (China, India, South Africa), 
and market-based instruments designed to reduce 
emissions have been employed (China, India). In 
addition, China has shut down inefficient, contam-
inating power stations and companies. These steps 
primarily aim to improve energy security and lim-
it local air pollution or the local effects of climate 
change. If, however, the expected self-interest 
gained from these measures also benefits the glob-
al climate, what is wrong with that? 
The Future of Climate Governance
The likelihood of the Paris climate conference’s 
success is questionable given the interests demon-
strated and the central actors’ lack of willingness 
to commit to concrete goals. Consequently, the cli-
mate summit could fail, or a new agreement with-
out binding commitments could be concluded. Be-
cause time is running out for a cost-effective limi-
tation of climate change, alternatives to a global re-
gime need to be discussed. Several models for this 
are already circulating. The following three sce-
narios make clear that the global community does 
not need to remain incapable of action. On the con-
trary, new options could bring about better results 
than a new global agreement catering to the low-
est denominator.
1. Chaotic Polycentrism: International, region-
al, and local agreements of various relevance con-
tinue to exist, which, in the ideal case, could put in 
motion an upwards spiral of climate-policy ambi-
tion (Ostrom 2012). The climate change goals could 
be reached through such a process, even without a 
global agreement. But the variety of activities could 
also lead to climate governance “al gusto,” which 
ultimately would not achieve the 2°C goal. In this 
scenario, the (weak) global climate regime would 
remain one of many initiatives of varying orien-
tation. The missing sanctioning power in a weak 
global agreement could be decried publicly to a 
certain extent (media and civil society) and thus 
gain in weight. In comparison to a strong, compre-
hensive contract with a consistent price for green-
house gas emissions, multiple agreements and ini-
tiatives would be less cost-effective but more like-
ly to be implemented (Barrett and Toman 2010). In 
this scenario, industrialised and emerging econo-
mies would not only have almost all possible op-
portunities for proactive climate protection but 
would also have many opportunities to take the 
path of least resistance. Thus, the option “chaotic 
polycentrism” would most likely not reduce glob-
al emissions enough or in time.
2. Copenhagen Theory: The great transforma-
tion does not come “from above,” but many small 
steps “from below” add up. Voluntary citizen en-
gagement can lead to change in the face of a shock, 
as many initiatives on the part of churches, cities, 
and civil society organisations show. Social pres-
sure could achieve comprehensive measures in the 
sense of a global citizens movement (Wagner and 
Weitzman 2015; WBGU 2014). The state creates in-
centives for this through campaigns or sustainable 
infrastructure. The drawback of this approach is 
that such a transformation will take a long time, be 
geographically limited, and scarcely impact emis-
sions-intensive economic sectors. The probability 
of success in initiating larger transformation pro-
cesses only from below in emerging economies is 
clearly also limited, because it is precisely in these 
countries that civic engagement is less common or 
suppressed. Despite the presence of an environ-
mental awareness in many states, it is likely dif-
ficult to transmit the link between individual re-
sponsibility and sustainable consumption patterns 
to citizens. Thus, Scenario 2 can always function as 
a catalyst for a climate agreement but will not have 
a global impact.
3. Climate Clubs: Large countries determined 
to act move forward with an agreement, found 
clubs, and subsequently force latecomers or the 
unwilling to participate through trade sanctions 
(on climate-damaging products or the entire range 
of exports) (Nordhaus 2015). Climate clubs can on-
ly operate effectively when they are dominated by 
the key players (the United States, China, and the 
EU).
The current climate governance architecture con-
sists of multiple forums and agreements. Here, in-
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dividual governments and civil society agree on a 
joint approach. Some of these constellations have 
already been analysed using the concept of club 
governance. Nordhaus’s (2015) much-discussed 
model examines the stability of such coalitions: 
Without sanctions against non-members they tend 
to be unstable and only reduce emissions in a lim-
ited way. If, in contrast, important states impose 
trade sanctions on less influential countries with 
high emissions, a small climate club comes into 
being through these sanctions. This could lead to 
a stable coalition that significantly reduces emis-
sions. If the price of USD 50 per tonne of CO2 were 
implemented, emissions could be decreased nota-
bly. Within such a club, the EU, the United States, 
and China, for example, would profit most from 
joining and would thus naturally have a strong im-
pact on the reduction of global emissions (Nord-
haus 2015).
What is problematic is that the trade sanctions 
clash with current WTO agreements. Exemptions 
would need to be negotiated, something which 
may not be that unlikely given the current trend 
towards more regional trade agreements. The ad-
vantage of climate clubs is that, depending on how 
the measures are developed, fewer hindrances to 
ratification exist. The lower number of conflict par-
ties would function positively, particularly when 
businesses were more strongly integrated. In the 
event of a failed or weak Paris climate agreement, 
a first step could be a coalition of the willing made 
up of several industrialised countries and some de-
veloping countries or emerging economies. These 
developing countries would have to be offered the 
possibility of concrete financial, technological, or 
trade-related help. The advantage of climate clubs 
over a weak agreement that does not achieve the 
2°C goal is the possibility of sanctions and of a the-
matic focus.
In all three scenarios, the United States, the EU, 
and Germany – as well as China, Brazil, India, and 
South Africa – could take on a central role. For sce-
narios 2 and 3, a global climate agreement is not 
mandatory. Exogenous shocks or crises can un-
leash transformative change when old path de-
pendencies are broken down and new windows of 
opportunity are utilised. To date, only very slow, 
step-by-step change in climate protection has tak-
en place. With skilled negotiation by an important 
group of countries such as the EU, Scenario 3 could 
gain the support of the United States and possibly 
China, whereas Scenario 1 can be seen as the low-
est common denominator for all parties.
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